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Abstract
This paper presents an agency theory of revolutionary political transitions from au-
tocracy to democracy. We model authoritarian economic policy as the equilibrium
outcome of a repeated game between an elite ruling class and a disenfranchised work-
ing class, in which workers have imperfect information about the elite’s policy choice
and the economy’s productive capacity. We characterize the conditions under which,
in equilibrium, (i) the elite will set inefficient economic institutions under the threat
of revolution, (ii) information shocks can catalyze democratic revolutions that may be
contagious among similar countries, and (iii) democracy can be consolidated following
a political transition.
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1 Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall, popular protest movements,
from Eastern Europe to the Middle East, have challenged authoritarian rule and called for
transitions to democratic political institutions. Concurrently, economists have paid more
and more attention to the role of political institutions and civil conflict in shaping economic
institutions and development paths. In this paper, we examine how the predatory incentives
of autocratic governments can lead to inefficient economic institutions when the threat of
revolution constrains the autocratic institutional choice problem. Given the autocrat’s choice
to pursue a sclerotic development path to patronize the “elite”, we consider the conditions
under which a risky democratic revolution can be the rational choice of the disenfranchised.1
We take a novel view on non-democratic economic policy-making under the threat of
revolution that incorporates an informational asymmetry between the elite ruling class and
the disenfranchised working class. As such, we consider autocratic policy-making within the
context of a principal-agent problem, a classic method of analyzing economic policy-making
when political accountability is enforced democratically (Barro, 1973; Ferejohn, 1986; Besley,
2006).
Autocratic policy-makers, like their rent-seeking democratic counterparts, solve self-interested
optimization problems, constrained by their accountability to the principals they “represent”.
While dissonant politicians can be removed through the electoral process in democratic soci-
eties, dictators can only be unseated by revolution or coup d’e´tat. Our focus in this paper is
on the “revolution constraint”. The dictator would like to extract the maximum possible rent
through his control over economic policy, but the threat of revolution constrains his ability
to do so (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001, 2006). The first-order conditions of the autocrat’s
policy-making problem are similar to those found in the (democratic) political agency liter-
ature. The dictator will continue to predate more of the economic output until the marginal
benefit of higher current-period predatory revenue equates to the expected cost of provoking
revolution with a marginally higher probability.2
We apply this political agency logic to a model where authoritarian economic policy
is the Markov perfect equilibrium of a repeated game between an elite ruling class and a
disenfranchised class of society that can choose to revolt (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001).
1Throughout, we consider the elite ruling class as a single player. The autocratic economic policy that
the dictator sets represents a choice on behalf of the elite, so we use the terms “autocrat”, “dictator”, and
“elite” interchangeably.
2See Acemoglu et al. (2010) for a theory where the principle-agent relationship is between the elite and
the military. To our knowledge, Acemoglu et al. (2010) is the only other paper to explicitly discuss dictators
as agents. Our model does not consider the role of the military, but focuses instead on the principle-agent
relationship between the elite and the working class.
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To maximize lifetime expected predatory revenues, the elite choose between an efficient,
publicly observable method of predation (non-distortionary income tax) and an inefficient,
hidden method (entry costs on a middle class of entrepreneurs) that is not observed by the
working class.3 We show that efficient predation through taxation features a “conciliatory
income tax rate”, which the elite can adjust to maintain power if the level of revolutionary
threat changes.
The inefficient method, by contrast, imposes hidden (from the workers) barriers to entry
on middle class entrepreneurs, which suppress the demand for labor and the wage rate to
an extent that allows less efficient, elite entrepreneurs to make abnormal profits. Through-
out, we refer to this policy as one of “factor price manipulation” (Acemoglu, 2006, 2010).
When the elite choose to manipulate factor prices, the economy produces below its capac-
ity, there is unemployed labor, and labor’s share of output is low. Workers would prefer
a laissez-faire economic institution if they knew there was a potential for full employment.
Importantly, entry barriers are not observable by the working class and their suppression
cannot be immediately achieved.
This structure of our model makes it impossible for the elite to credibly commit to remov-
ing barriers to entry once they are set in place. Our framework captures the fact that, due
to the nefarious social norms of commerce that emerge when firms are subjected to stochas-
tic barriers of entry over extended periods, a policy of systematic factor price manipulation
makes the dictator’s decision one of economic institutional choice.
In our model, workers do not know, a priori, whether bad economic outcomes follow
directly from the elite’s economic policy or whether the economy is naturally under-developed,
with an insufficient mass of entrepreneurs able to run relatively large formal firms (La Porta
and Schliefer, 2008). As a result, when the elite choose to manipulate factor prices, there is
an informational asymmetry between the ruling class and the working class about the source
of the economy’s stagnation. We analyze the conditions under which the elite will rationally
choose the inefficient predatory instrument, at the risk of revolt (Acemoglu, 2006).
Information shocks can update workers’ perceptions of the relation between economic out-
comes and the economic institution. Examples of such shocks include increases in foreign me-
dia access, development of information technology, unauthorized release of confidential state
secrets, etc.4 The Markov perfect equilibrium can transition to a democratically-determined,
3Note that tax policy could be interpreted more broadly as a levy on consumption of goods, services, and
basic necessities that elites do not have to pay, and not necessarily a formal income tax. Of course, any
tax policy would be distortionary in reality. Here, we follow the lead of Acemoglu (2006) in supposing that
taxation is less distortionary than stochastic entry barriers. Explicitly modeling a dead-weight cost function
associated with taxation would not qualitatively affect our results.
4Note that the Tunisian revolution began several weeks following the release of confidential American
State Department cables about the Tunisian dictator by Wikileaks.
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laissez-faire economic institution if the information shock is strong enough to make the ex-
pected net benefit of revolting positive.5 Moreover, the paper demonstrates that inefficient
economic institutions may be a lasting equilibrium, with regime duration essentially following
the probability distributions of random information variables.
To our knowledge, we are the first to consider the role of asymmetric information be-
tween the elite class in control of economic policy and the disenfranchised class in a rational
choice model of political transition to democracy. Previous work that has incorporated in-
formational asymmetries into models of democratic revolutions (or mass movements) have
concentrated on asymmetries between members of the disenfranchised class (Kuran, 1989;
Lohmann, 1994; Bueno de Mesquita, 2010; Ellis and Fender, 2010). In these papers, the
disenfranchised know that if the revolution succeeds, they will all be better off. What is
unknown is the revolutionary zeal of others in the disenfranchised class, which determines
the prospects of overcoming the free-rider problem in collective action. In our model, the
key uncertainty among the disenfranchised is the growth potential of the economy following
a democratic revolution and transition to laissez-faire.
Our paper provides a departure from the literature on conflict more generally, where
struggles for power are usually considered within a zero-sum world. In this literature, con-
flict is the result of competition over a fixed supply of economic resources between competing
groups (Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007). In one prominent early contribution (Grossman,
1991), conflictual insurrections and their suppressions are purely wasteful diversions of labor
resources from productive activity to the wage-paying activities of insurrection and its pre-
vention. Our paper considers instead conflict over control of economic institutions, rather
than over control of economic assets. The uncertainty we introduce is that the working class
does not know whether revolution and transition to a laissez-faire economic institution is a
zero-sum proposition.
Another novel feature of our model is the possibility of revolutionary contagion. We
suppose the costs of revolution are uncertain, ex ante, so agents form cost expectations.
This uncertainty comes from the fact that would-be revolutionaries do not know whether
the military will remain loyal to the elite or how the international community will react, for
example. If the cost of an initial revolt was low, would-be revolutionaries abroad update
their own cost expectations and revolutions can spread to similar countries.6
In Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), Chassang and Padro-i-Miquel (2009), and many oth-
5As is prevalent in the economics literature, we take a rationalist view of revolutionary activity; the
disenfranchised class pursues a costly revolution if its expected net utility exceeds the utility provided by the
status quo. In the spirit of Tullock (1971), we do not consider the public good payoff of institutional reform
in the decision-making calculus of would-be revolutionaries.
6Aidt and Jensen (2011) consider a similar information transmission from revolutions abroad in the deci-
sion to extend the voting franchise due to a heightened threat of revolution at home.
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ers, political transitions to democracy occur during adverse business cycle shocks, which
reduce output but do not necessarily increase unemployment levels. The incentive to revolt
in these papers is stronger during recessions, since the revolution will destroy a fraction of
(the temporarily lower) economic output. Rather, we focus on macroeconomic causes of
revolutions that are more structural, such as sclerotic long-run growth paths that feature
chronic unemployment.7 In our theory, persistent unemployment of labor and low wages are
key characteristics of the equilibrium in which revolutions are possible.
Finally, we consider the conditions under which democracy can be successfully consoli-
dated following a revolution. When the growth potential of the economy is revealed following
a revolution and transition to laissez-faire, the elite can invest in mounting a coup and workers
can invest in consolidating democracy. We identify the set of individually rational invest-
ments each side would be willing to make to control the economic institution and analyze
when democracy can be consolidated.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first section describes the economic environment of
our model. In the second section, we derive the equilibrium choice of economic institutions
and discuss how contagious democratic revolutions can be sparked by information shocks.
The third section analyze the conditions under which post-revolutionary democracy can be
consolidated. Our model was inspired by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, brief histories
of which are discussed in the fourth section. The final section offers our concluding remarks.
2 Economic environment
2.1 Production structure, economic policies, and output
The economy is populated by a continuum that measures L+ θm + θe of risk-neutral agents
whose objective is to maximize their lifetime expected consumption.8 The three groups of
agents represent a working class (L), a middle class of entrepreneurs (m) and an elite class
(e). For simplicity and without loss of generality, we normalize the population of elites to
measure one (θe = 1). We assume that the middle class is at least as big as the elite class
(θm ≥ 1) and that the working class makes up the majority of the population (L > θm + θe).
As such, in a democracy the median voter would be from the working class.
Agents from both the middle class and the elite class can become entrepreneurs. Denote
the productivity of middle class and elite entrepreneurs by Am and Ae, respectively. We
7See Acemoglu (2008) for a comparison of oligarchic and democratic societies that allows for such sclerotic
equilibria.
8The production and regulatory structures of the model are adaptations of Acemoglu (2006) and Acemoglu
(2010).
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assume that middle class entrepreneurs are at least as productive as the elites, i.e., Am ≥ Ae.
We also assume that elite entrepreneurs have productivity Ae if and only if middle class
entrepreneurs are not in the market (otherwise, the elite’s productivity is normalized to 0,
without loss of generality).9
Development constraints limit each entrepreneur to profitably employ λ workers, who
supply labor inelastically. The parameter λ describes the saturation point for firms’ organi-
zational scale in developing economies and we assume that firms that enter the market always
operate at the saturation point. Denoting the set of entrepreneurs by E, the labor market
clearing condition is that
∫
j∈E l
jdj ≤ L, where lj is the labor demanded by entrepreneur j.
We impose two important conditions on the measures of the entrepreneurial classes. First,
we assume that θe < L/λ, which means that there will always be an excess supply of labor
in the formal labor market when only elite entrepreneurs produce. Second, we allow for the
possibility that middle class entrepreneurs are insufficient in measure to fully employ the
labor force, i.e., θm ≥ L/λ or θm = θe = 1. Whether or not the middle class is of suffi-
cient measure to generate excess demand for labor when resource allocation is uninhibited
by economic policy will be a key source of uncertainty in the model.
Economic institutions are initially controlled by the elite, whose objective is to maximize
their expected lifetime income. We suppose that the elite choose between two types of
predatory economic institutions, one of which is distortionary and inefficient. The non-
distortionary method of predation is to directly tax labor income at rate τ ∈ [0, 1]. Since labor
is supplied inelastically, there are no marginal decisions and an income tax is equivalent to a
non-distortionary lump-sum tax. The elites can make group-specific transfers to themselves
with the revenue generated through income taxation.10 Alternatively, the elite may choose
to impose barriers to entry on middle class agents that discourage them from becoming
entrepreneurs. Under this policy, each period, middle class entrepreneurs must pay bm, which
is purely wasteful and provides the elite with no direct revenues. As they affect production
decisions in the economy, barriers to entry are distortionary. Importantly, the imposition of
barriers to entry on middle class entrepreneurs are not directly observable by workers, who
only observe labor market outcomes. Given a wage rate of w and barriers to entry bm the
9This assumption simplifies exposition of the main ideas presented in our model. Allowing for elite and
middle class entrepreneurs to be in the market at the same time does not change qualitatively our main
results.
10We have assumed that the elite have access to an efficient method of predation, as in Acemoglu (2010).
Several studies have recently noted that states are generally not endowed with efficient fiscal instruments,
but must invest in the government’s fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson, 2009, 2010). We abstract from
the investment issue and analyze the conditions under which the elite will choose to implement inefficient
institutions.
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profit of middle class and elite entrepreneurs, respectively, are given by
pim(w, bm) = (Am − w)lm − bm and pie(w) = (Ae − w)le.
We assume that w ∈ [w,Am], where w > 0 is a minimum living wage for workers in the
formal sector. We assume that the formal sector living wage is greater than the worker’s
outside option for informal work.11 Furthermore, we suppose that Am > Ae > w, so that the
elite can make a strictly positive profit at w = w, but not at w = Am. Given the supply and
demand for labor, when there are entry costs, the equilibrium wage rate will be
w =
max {Am − bm/λ, w} if θm > L/λw if θm = θe =< L/λ
If entry costs are such that Am − bm/λ < w, then no middle class producers can make a
positive profit, there are only elite producers, and the wage rate has been manipulated down
to w.12 When there are no entry costs (bm = 0), only middle class entrepreneurs produce
and the wage rate is Am if λθm > L and w if λθm = λ < L. Note the possibility that there
is an excess supply of labor even if there are no barriers to entry.
As described above, we consider two cases that relate to the level of economic development,
which we proxy by the measure of middle class entrepreneurs relative to the measure of
workers. In the first case, there is a tragedy of development, in which θm = θe = 1 < L/λ,
and there are not enough middle class entrepreneurs to provide sufficient demand for the
entire labor force, regardless of the economic institution. In the second case, there is a
potential for full employment, such that θm > L/λ > θe = 1. To begin, we consider the
second case and assume that the elites know that θm > L/λ, but that workers do not (we
relax this assumption later when we consider democratic consolidation).
The total level of (non-storable) economic output in the economy depends on the level of
development and the economic policy of the elite. When there is no development tragedy, if
bm = 0 total economic output is given by Y = AmL, the wage rate is given by w = Am, and
the labor share of income is complete. If, on the other hand, the elite impose barriers to entry
sufficient to suppress the demand for labor by the middle class, i.e., bm > λ(Am − w), then
11A common characteristic of economies that are early along the development path is that low-productivity
informal sectors are relatively large. La Porta and Schliefer (2008) show that workers are very similar between
formal and informal sectors, but managers are very different. When low-productivity informal sectors are
large, wage rates in formal sector are often not competitively determined, as outside informal options are
low-wage, and labor share of economic output from formal sector production is very low. See also Djankov
et al. (2002).
12This can be interpreted as a reduced-form of labor market matching models (Pissarides, 2000) where
workers have limited bargaining power when there are few alternative employment opportunities.
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only elite entrepreneurs produce and total output is Y = Aeλ < AmL. The wage rate in this
case is w and the labor share is w/Ae < 1. Thus, in the absence of a development tragedy,
total income and the workers’ share depend on the elite’s choice of economic institution.13
In order to simplify exposition and without loss of generality, we define w ≡ αAm < Ae.
We suppose that the government, as well, must leave workers with a living wage of w = αAm,
so the taxable income of workers is, therefore, (1−α)Am. The tax payments per worker will
be τ(1 − α)Am if w = Am and zero if w = w = αAm. Later, it will be useful to consider
workers’ net income in these terms, as [1− τ(1− α)]Am.
Without the threat of revolution, the elite choose the non-distortionary mode of predation
and set τ = 1 to maximize their consumption.14 When a revolutionary threat exists, the elite
may choose the hidden mode of predation to secure abnormal profits for less efficient elite
producers if the threat of revolution sufficiently constrains the tax revenues the elite could
raise through a publicly observable income tax.
2.2 Information structure in the economy
2.2.1 Perceptions of economic capacity
If the working class observes low wages and unemployment, they cannot be sure it results
from barriers to entry. The bad economic outcome could also result from a lack of middle
class entrepreneurs in an environment where the dictatorship is benevolent and maximizes
social welfare. If there are low wages and unemployment in the economy, workers believe with
probability ρ that the outcome is a direct result of the dictator’s economic institution and
that a laissez-faire economic institution would feature full employment. Since the potential
for growth is only possible if there is a sufficient measure of middle class entrepreneurs
(θm > L/λ), we refer to ρ as the workers’ confidence in the middle class.15 With probability
1−ρ, workers believe that there is a genuine tragedy of development and that unemployment
would persist even with a laissez-faire economic institution.
We suppose that the level of confidence in the middle class among workers has a period-
specific stochastic term, i.e., ρt = ρ+ t, where  is distributed according to some mean-zero
13In a previous version, we present several panel regressions that verify the stylized facts in our model.
Notably, we demonstrate that (i) labor shares increase along the development path, (ii) labor shares are higher
in democracies (Rodrik, 1999), (iii) labor shares are higher where economic regulation is less stringent, (iv)
informal sectors are larger in less developed countries, and (v) economic regulations are more stringent in
autocracies. These results are available upon request.
14Indeed, (Am − w)L > (Ae − w)λ in the case of no development tragedy where w = Am and λθm > L
and (Am − w)λθm > (Ae − w)λ in the case of development tragedy where w = w and θm = θe = 1.
15An earlier version of the paper described ρ as the level of skepticism about the dictator. Either description
works, but there is likely to be more uncertainty about the depth of the middle class vis-a-vis the intentions
of a dictator.
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monotone distribution, F , over support [, ¯]. We assume that the distribution of information
shocks is commonly known. The expected value of ρt is therefore simply E(ρt) = ρ +∫
dF () = ρ. Shocks to ρ are therefore transitory. The realized value of ρt depends on the
regime’s long-term reputation in society, ρ, and the period-specific shocks, t. We discuss
different examples of such shocks later in the paper.
2.2.2 Perception of the cost of revolution
Revolutions are costly. The elite lose everything after a revolution as they no longer control
economic policy. Without manipulating factor prices, the elite cannot compete with mid-
dle class entrepreneurs and they no longer have the ability to set targeted fiscal transfers.
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and others, a fraction of workers’ income (µt) is
destroyed in the wake of a revolution that occurs in period t. We propose an uncertainty
concerning the cost of revolution for workers. In concrete terms, would-be revolutionaries do
not know, a priori, whether the dictator will respond with repression or whether the inter-
national community will intervene, for example. With a slight abuse of notation, we define
µ = E(µt).
For simplicity, suppose that the destructive costs of revolutions follow a two-point distri-
bution over {µ, µ¯}. There are two possible informational states of nature, a bad state, Wb,
and a good state, Wg. In state Wb, the probability that the revolution cost is high is p and
in state Wg, the probability that revolution cost is high is q, where p > q. We assume that, a
priori, being in the good or bad state is equally likely, i.e., prob(W = Wb) = prob(W = Wg)
= 1/2. Therefore, the a priori expected value of the cost of revolution in period t is given by:
E(µt) =
1
2
[
pµ+ (1− p)µ¯]+ 1
2
[
qµ+ (1− q)µ¯] . (1)
Suppose a small set N of identical countries. If a country i ∈ N experiences a revolution
whose cost was revealed to be µ, the N−i other countries update their expectation of the state
of nature in a Bayesian manner within each period. A posteriori, the expected probability
that the state of nature is good becomes
P (Wg|µ) =
P (µ|Wg)P (Wg)
P (µ)
=
P (µ|Wg)P (Wg)
P (µ|Wg)P (Wg) + P (µ|Wb)P (Wb) =
1
2
p
1
2
p+ 1
2
q
>
1
2
, (2)
since p > q. In other words, if a revolution in one country i shown to be low-cost, the
N−i other countries update their expectations such that they believe it is more likely that
W = Wg. The updated beliefs lowers the expected value of the destructive costs of revolution
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within the period, i.e.,
E(µt,N−i|µi = µ) =
1
2
p
1
2
p+ 1
2
q
[
pµ+ (1− p)µ¯]+ 12q1
2
q + 1
2
p
[
qµ+ (1− q)µ¯] < E(µt) (3)
since p > q. Information updating on the costs of revolution is also period-specific. The
expected cost of revolution reverts back to µ at the beginning of the following period.
2.3 Timing, strategies and definition of an equilibrium
We consider the formation of the elite’s economic policy as the equilibrium outcome of a
repeated game between the classes in which the elite’s policy decisions are constrained by
the threat of revolution. Because workers are the majority, the decisive voter in a democracy
would be a worker. We suppose that the democratically determined economic policy would
be laissez-faire, since output and labor’s net share are higher without entry barriers or income
taxes.16 Agents form their decisions by maximizing lifetime expected stream of consumption,
so expected lifetime utility of individual i is given by
U i0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtcit. (4)
In this rationalist conception, the workers form an expected utility of revolution based on its
current-period destructive costs and the probability that the economy gets to full employment
after instituting a laissez-faire economic institution.
If a fraction ζ of the population takes part in revolutionary activities, the revolution
always succeeds. We assume that L/(L + θe + θm) > ζ, but that θm/(L + θe + θm) < ζ.
That is, the workers are sufficiently numerous to revolt successfully, but the middle class of
entrepreneurs is not. To highlight the competition between groups for control over economic
institutions, we abstract from the collective political action problem and treat workers as a
unitary player against the elite in a repeated game. Since the workers’ share in the population
is greater than ζ, if the workers decide to revolt, it always succeeds.
Each period, the incumbent elite choose their economic policy and then the workers choose
whether or not to revolt. We suppose that the elite are predatory, but the workers cannot
be sure of this. For now, we consider a transition to democracy as an absorbing state, so
that if the workers decide to revolt, democracy is consolidated. The timing of events within
a period is the following.
16Implicitly, we do not consider the redistributive potential of control over fiscal policy, since the elite lose
everything if a revolution succeeds. Similarly, we do not consider the incentive to control natural resources.
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1. Elites choose whether or not to impose barriers to entry (b = 1 or b = 0), having in
mind the distribution of ρt and µt. If b = 0, the elite can modify the tax rate at any
moment. Barriers to entry, however, cannot be removed within a period.17 Production
takes place for the period.
2. The value of the shock to ρt is revealed and workers choose whether or not to revolt.
3. If there was a revolution in another country, the expectation on µ is updated and
workers choose whether or not to revolt.
4. Taxes are collected and consumption takes place. If a revolt occurs, democracy is
consolidated and the game ends (we will relax this assumption later with the possibility
for the elite to mount a coup following a revolt). If no revolt occurs, go back to 1.
There is one state variable in the model, S = {E,D}, which describes whether economic
policy is controlled democratically (D) or by the elite (E). The economy each period is
characterized by an information structure, which we denote by the vector ι = 〈µ, ρ, µt, ρt〉
for the expectation and the realized values of the information parameters. There are two
types of decision-making agents, a ∈ {e, l}, representing elites and workers (middle class
entrepreneurs are not strategic actors in the game). Actions of the elites follow from a
strategy, denoted σe(S, ι). The action spaces for the elite are b ∈ {0, 1}, which determines
whether the elite impose barriers to entry or not, and τ ∈ [0, 1]. Actions of the workers follow
from a strategy, denoted by σl(S, ι). The worker’s action space is simple r ∈ {0, 1}, where
r = 1 indicates that the workers’ action is to revolt. If r = 1, the state transitions from E to
D and in the process, a share µt of all labor income is destroyed. The Markovian strategies
are represented by the following mapping:
σ : S × {e, l} −→ {0, 1}2 × [0, 1].
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a mapping σ∗ that is a best response to itself at
any point in history, i.e., a strategy combination such that each player’s strategy is the best
response to the other’s for all possible states. Consider the following pair of recursive value
functions:
V e(S) = max
σe
{
ce(σ̂l, σe, S) + β
∫
V e(S
′
)dP (S
′|σ̂l, σe, S)
}
, and (5)
17In terms of our results, assuming that barriers to entry cannot be removed within a period is equivalent
to assuming that removing barriers to entry does affect the level of economic output in the short-term (within
a period).
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V l(S) = max
σl
{
cl(σ̂e, σl, S) + β
∫
V l(S
′
)dP (S
′|σ̂e, σl, S)
}
(6)
where ci denotes the consumption of agent i as a function of the state S and strategies.
P (S
′|σ̂l, σe, S) denotes the probability distribution function of transition from state S to
S
′
as a function of the strategies, σe and σl, as well as the initial state. A pure Markov
perfect equilibrium is a strategy combination {σ̂e(S, ι); σ̂l(S, ι)}, such that σ̂e solves equation
(5) and σ̂l solves equation (6) within each time period. This defines a sequence of policies,
actions, and political institutions. As the game played each period is the same, the economic
institutional choices are stable if there is not a transition of political institutions.
3 Equilibrium institutional choice
Throughout the section, we focus on the case where the state is initially controlled by the elite
(S = E), there is no development tragedy (θm > L/λ), and the elite are well-informed about
the economy’s potential for full employment. In a later section, we relax the assumption
that the elite are well-informed in this way. As the information parameters return to the
same expected value each period, the choice of the elite will be consistent across periods.
Therefore, policy choice is similar, in spirit, to an institutional choice, since policy-makers
face the same optimization problem at the beginning of each period. This set-up captures
the fact that economic institutional choice is long-lasting. Our set-up does not allow for
economic institutions, once set, to be changed without a transition to democracy first.
Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), we consider the threat of revolt as a constraint
that affects the policy choice of the elite. In the following subsections, we consider how policy
choices under the two predatory instruments are constrained by the threat of revolution.
We analyze the game using backward induction. Since the elite move first, we begin by
considering the strategy of the workers, given the strategy of the elites. We then discuss
institutional choice in equilibrium and how information shocks can result in revolutions,
which may be contagious among similar countries. The final subsection concerns democratic
consolidation when democracy is not an absorbing state.
3.1 Case 1: Efficient predation - income taxation
The dictator chooses whether or not to implement barriers to entry, b ∈ {0, 1} and the level
of taxation if b = 0. The problem of setting the tax rate is constrained by the workers’ threat
of revolt. We begin by deriving the revolution constraint and proceed to solve for the elite’s
optimal income tax rate when b = 0. Recalling that the workers’ taxable income is given
12
by (1 − α)Am, workers choose to revolt (r = 1) or not (r = 0) to maximize the following
recursive value function at stage 2 (before µ is updated for the period):
V l(E|τ > 0) = (1− rµ)[1− τ(1− α)]Am + β [(1− r)V l(E|τ > 0) + rV l(D)] , (7)
where the value to the workers of being in democracy is given by
V l(D|τ > 0) =
∞∑
j=t
βjAm =
Am
1− β . (8)
Using (8) in (7) and a little algebra, we rewrite the value function as
V l(E|τ > 0) =
[
1
1− β(1− r)
] [
(1− rµ)[1− τ(1− α)]Am + r
(
βAm
1− β
)]
(9)
The revolution constraint in the case of income taxation is given by
V l(E|τ > 0, r = 0)− V l(E|τ > 0, r = 1) ≥ 0. (10)
The problem of the elite then is to choose the highest tax rate such that the revolution
constraint is satisfied. The elite will increase the tax rate to the point that workers are
indifferent between revolution and the status quo (when the constraint holds with equality).
In other words, the critical tax rate, τ ∗ solves the following expression:(
1
1− β
)
[1− (1− α)τ ]Am = (1− µ)[1− τ(1− α)]Am + βA
m
1− β (11)
Algebraic manipulation yields the critical tax rate as a function of the model’s parameters.
τ ∗(α, β, µ) =
(
1
1− α
)[
µ(1− β)
β + µ(1− β)
]
(12)
The tax rate given by equation (12) is the “conciliatory” tax rate; it is the highest the elite
can set while preventing revolution. We make the following assumption to ensure that there
are no corner solutions in the elite’s problem of setting an optimal income tax rate.
Assumption 1. The workers revolt with certainty if τ = 1. In other words, V l(E|τ =
1)− V l(D) < 0, which has sufficient condition that µ < β(1− α)/[α(1− β)].
We have assumed that tax rates can be changed instantaneously to conciliate the workers
if a revolution in another country causes the expected cost of revolution to deviate from its
ex-ante expected value at stage 3. Equation (12) should be understood as the tax rate that
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elites set based on their ex-ante expectations as well as on the ex-post realization of µt should
a revolution occur abroad within the period. For example, a low-cost revolution abroad at
stage 3 of the game induces an adjustment of the conciliatory tax rate to τ ∗
′
< τ ∗. Note that
over the long-run, workers expect that the tax rate is stable at τ ∗ and elites, when adjusting
τ following a shock, know that workers expect the tax rate to return to τ ∗. Since the cost of
revolution is reset to µ each period, so too is the conciliatory tax rate reset to that given by
equation (12) if the elite choose to raise revenue through taxation. The adjusted conciliatory
tax rate is the solution to
V l(E|τ > 0) = [1− rE(µt|µi = µ)] [1− τ(1− α)]Am+β [(1− r)V l(E|τ > 0) + rV l(D|τ > 0)] ,
where
V l(E|τ > 0) = (1− τ
∗)Am
1− β .
Solving for the adjusted critical value yields
τ ∗
′
=
(
1
1− α
)[
(1− β)E(µt|µi = µ)− βτ ∗
(1− β)E(µt|µi = µ)
]
,
which is strictly positive provided that (1 − β)E(µt|µi = µ) − βτ ∗ > 0, which we assume
to hold. This captures the notion that when policy choices are flexible within an economic
institution, the dictator can adjust the policy to prevent revolution should there be a shock
to the parameters. In an economic institution that does not feature policy flexibility, this is
not the case. Here, we make the extreme assumption that political transitions can always be
avoided if predatory policy is flexible. The following proposition summarizes our discussion
of predatory tax policy when there exists a revolutionary threat.
Proposition 1. Under the threat of revolution and if assumption 1 is satisfied, there is a
conciliatory tax rate, 0 < τ ∗ < 1, that is the highest the elite can impose without provoking a
revolution. The conciliatory tax rate is (i) decreasing in β and (ii) increasing in µ.
The proposition implies that, while the threat of revolution affects the tax rate imple-
mented, workers will never revolt when the elite chose efficient economic institutions. The
comparative statics are intuitive. First, the more that workers value future income, the
higher is the incentive to revolt since democracy is an absorbing state and revolution only
has current period costs. Greater patience in the working class therefore strengthens the
revolution constraint and decreases the conciliatory tax rate. Second, with respect to µ, the
more costly are revolutions (in expectation), the looser is the revolution constraint and the
higher will be the conciliatory tax rate within the period.
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Notice that in the case of efficient predation, there are no informational problems. If the
workers observe wage rates above their outside option wage, low unemployment, and labor
income taxation, it is revealed that the elite are not manipulating factor prices.18
3.2 Case 2: Inefficient predation - factor price manipulation
Now, we consider the case of inefficient predation. The elite set the entry barrier high enough
to prevent the middle class entrepreneurs from making positive profits, thus suppressing the
demand for labor (and the wage rate) to a point where elite entrepreneurs can produce
profitably.
Workers do not directly observe barriers to entry; they only observe the resulting eco-
nomic outcome of low wages and unemployment in the official sector. This is observationally
equivalent to the outcome if the authoritarian policy were non-distortionary and benevolent,
but there was a tragedy of development. In period t, workers believe with probability ρt
that the economic institution is inefficient and a cause for the bad economic outcome. With
probability 1− ρt, on the other hand, workers believe there is a tragedy of development that
is not a result of distortionary economic institutions. The workers decide whether to revolt
(r = 1) or not (r = 0) to maximize the following value function:
V l(E|τ = 0) = (1− rµ)εαAm + β [(1− r)V l(E|τ = 0) + rV l(D|τ = 0)] (13)
where ε ≡ (θeλ)/L = λ/L is the employment rate and w ≡ αAm is the minimum living wage
for formal sector work, as before. Note that εαAm is the expected income of a worker who
does not observe income taxation, which corresponds to the living wage and the probability
of being employed in the official sector. The value of the workers of being in a democracy,
given that they did not observe income taxation and have realized the value of the shock to
ρ, is given by the following:
V l(D|τ = 0) = ρtA
m + (1− ρt)εαAm
1− β . (14)
Note that if the source of low demand for labor and low wages is perceived by the workers to
be a genuine lack of development (with probability 1− ρt), then a costly revolution will not
have an economic return for the working class. Taking into account the workers’ uncertainty
18One could similarly imagine a constraint on state capacity that prevented the dictator from imposing a
tax rate above some τ¯ (Besley and Persson, 2010). If τ¯ < τ∗, then clearly τ = τ¯ , which may provide further
incentive to engage in inefficient predation.
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and continuation values, equation (13) can be rewritten as:
V l(E|τ = 0) =
(
εαAm
1− β(1− r)
)[
1− rµ+
(
βr
1− β
)(
1− ρt + ρt
εα
)]
(15)
The workers will not revolt so long as the following constraint is satisfied:
V l(E|τ = 0, r = 0)− V l(E|τ = 0, r = 1) ≥ 0 (16)
Since factor price manipulation is not directly observable by the workers, the threshold
parameter in this case relates to the uncertainty we have built into the model. The threshold
information parameter ρ∗ is the highest ρt subject to the revolution constraint, which solves
the following expression:
εαAm
[
1− µ+
(
β
1− β
)(
1− ρt + ρt
εα
)]
=
εαAm
1− β (17)
Algebraic manipulation of the above expression yields the critical information parameter as
a function of the model’s parameters:
ρ∗(α, β, µ) =
(
εα
1− εα
)[
µ(1− β)
β
]
(18)
Equation (18) describes the threshold level of confidence in the middle class that is required
for a revolt to be rational for the workers. 19 The following assumption is purely technical
and ensures that 0 < ρ∗ < 1:
Assumption 2. If ρ = 1, then workers revolt with certainty and if ρ = 0, then workers never
revolt. A necessary condition is that, 1− µ+ β
1−β <
1
1−β < 1− µ+
(
β
1−β
) (
1
εα
)
.
Note that the critical value depends on the cost of revolution. While ρ∗ is stable across
periods, it can fluctuate within periods should there be revolutions abroad in the third stage of
the game. For example, a low-cost revolution abroad would change the threshold perception
parameter to some ρ < ρ˜ < ρ∗.
In the same manner, we identify a critical value for the destructive costs of a revolution,
for a given ρt. The critical value, µ
∗
t , solves equation (17) and can be expressed as
µ∗t (α, β, ε, ρ) =
(
β
1− β
)( ρt
εα
− ρt
)
(19)
19Since the workers do not observe the barriers to entry and the economic output cannot change within
periods, the elite cannot credibly commit to lifting all entry barriers in the future period, since they will have
an incentive to continue with the same policy.
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If µt > µ
∗, then workers will rationally not revolt.20 Note that the critical value for µ is
necessarily greater than zero if ρt > 0. When there is no cost to revolting, the workers will
always have an incentive to do so. There is no restriction on the upper bound for µ; the
destructive costs of revolution can exceed the period’s total output.
Note that the critical values of the parameters are linked to one another, since they are
both derived from the revolution constraint, equation (16). As a result, shocks to the current
period value of ρt that are strong enough to violate the constraint (i.e., ρt > ρ
∗) imply that
µ∗t gets pushed below µt. To see this, insert the expression for ρ
∗
t into equation (19) and
re-arrange to find that µ∗t = µt. Shocks to ρ that are insufficient to violate the revolution
constraint affect µ∗t , but cannot push it below µt. Conversely, shocks to µ that are strong
enough to violate the constraint imply that ρ∗t gets pushed above ρt. The next proposition
summarizes our discussion of the inefficient predatory policy.
Proposition 2. Under the threat of revolution, when workers do not observe their income
being taxed directly,
1. if assumption 2 is satisfied there is a threshold level of confidence in the middle class,
0 < ρ∗ < 1, below which the workers will not revolt, where ρ∗ is (i) decreasing in β, (ii)
increasing in ε, and (iii) increasing in µ, and
2. there is a threshold level of destruction, 0 < µ∗, above which the workers will not revolt,
where µ∗ is (i) increasing in β, (ii) decreasing in ε, and (iii) increasing in ρ.
The comparative statics on ρ∗ are intuitive. In the model, the returns to revolution extend
into future periods, but the costs are born only in the current period. Therefore, the threshold
level of confidence is lower when the workers have a stronger valuation of the future (higher
β). Secondly, when the employment rate in the current period is higher, workers have less
to gain from a costly revolt, so their threshold level of confidence is greater. Finally, when
the expected destructive cost of revolution is higher, workers will need to be more certain
that the dictator is manipulating factor prices and that there will be a return to revolting.
The critical value ρ∗ can be calculated by the dictator, assigned a probability according to
the distribution of , and used to calculate the expected net benefit for the autocrat of using
factor price manipulation, at risk of a revolution. The intuition behind the results concerning
µ∗ are similar.
20In much of the analysis of rational conflict, the expected value of conflict is compared to the value in the
status quo. When conflict leads to higher utility in expectation, agents contest assets of known value with
uncertain probabilities of success (characterized by contest functions). In our set-up, we have assumed that
the revolutions that occur are always successful if they include all of the working class. What is uncertain,
in our set-up, is the probability that a change in economic institutions will result in economic growth and
the cost of revolting. In expected value sense, our approach is similar to the analysis of conflict using contest
functions.
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We now describe how the elite view the probability of information shocks strong enough
to violate the revolution constraint, should the inefficient institution be chosen. Given ρ and
the distribution of , we define φρ ≡ 1− F (∗) = 1− F (ρ∗ − ρ) to be the probability of such
a shock. In the same manner, we define φµ to be the probability of a shock to µ sufficient
to drive µt below µ
∗. To simplify the analysis, we assume these shocks are independent. We
define the cumulative probability of a shock sufficient to violate the revolution constraint by
φ ≡ φρ + φµ. Of course, φµ changes if there is a shock to ρ in the second stage, as it affects
µ∗t , but this would not alter the decision of the autocrat in the first stage, before shocks are
revealed.
3.3 Equilibrium economic institutional choice
We now analyze the conditions under which the elite will choose to manipulate factor prices
and thus install inefficient economic institutions. The following assumption simply states
that the elite value future utility enough to ensure that they never choose the extreme policy
of predating the entire economic surplus in the first period, which provokes revolution with
certainty (due to Assumption 1).
Assumption 3. The elite prefer to prevent revolutions. In other words, V e(E|τ = τ ∗) −
V e(E|τ = 1) ≥ 0, which requires that τ ∗ > 1− β.
The elites must choose between erecting barriers to entry (b = 1) sufficient to manipulate
factor prices or taxing income at the conciliatory rate (b = 0). Recall that the threshold
perception parameter ρ∗ depends on the value of the cost of revolution parameter, µ. Since
µ follows a two-point distribution over {µ, µ}, the threshold parameter will have minimum
and maximum values, ρ∗ = ρ∗(µ) and ρ∗ = ρ∗(µ), respectively, where ρ∗ < ρ∗ < ρ∗.
If ρ is such that ρ+  > ρ∗, then for any possible shock, ρt > ρ∗, so as a result φ = 1 and
the workers revolt with certainty if the elite choose the inefficient economic institution. If
the elite were to choose a policy that resulted in revolution with certainty, they would rather
set τ = 1 since it would yield higher current period revenues,
(Am − w)λθm(1− µ) > (Ae − w)λ(1− µ).
On the contrary, if ρ is such that ρ +  < ρ∗, then for any possible shock, ρt < ρ∗, so as a
result φ = 0. We thus restrict our attention to the interesting range of parameter values for
which the elite consider manipulating factor prices.
The elites choose b ∈ {0, 1} to maximize the following recursive value function evaluated
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at stage one of the game in each period, before shocks to ρ and µ are revealed:
V e(E) = (1−b) [τ ∗(1− α)Amθmλ]+bλ(Ae−αAm)+β [(1− b)V e(E|τ > 0) + bCV e(E|b = 1)] ,
(20)
where τ ∗ is the expected value of the conciliatory tax rate at stage one and
CV e(E|b = 1) = (1− φ)V e(E|b = 1) (21)
is a continuation value that depend on whether the elites use factor price manipulation and φ
is the probability of an information shock severe enough to violate the revolution constraint
if b = 1. Taking into account the continuation values, the value function can be rewritten:
V e(E) =
(1− b) [τ ∗(1− α)Amθmλ] + b [λ(Ae − αAm)]
1− β[(1− b) + b(1− φ)] (22)
We require that the elite are individually rational when choosing to manipulate factor prices,
which is the case whenever the following holds:
V e(E|b = 1)− V e(E|b = 0) ≥ 0 (23)
We now solve for the threshold probability of a shock sufficient to violate the revolution con-
straint, φ∗, above which the elite will never manipulate factor prices. Rearranging equation
(22) and using (23) at equality, the critical value φ∗ solves the following:
λ(Ae − αAm)
1− β(1− φ) =
τ ∗(1− α)Amθmλ
1− β (24)
Algebraic manipulation of equation (24) yields the critical value as a function of the model’s
parameters.
φ∗(α,Ae, Am, β, θm) =
(Ae − αAm)(1− β)
τ ∗(1− α)Amθmβ −
1− β
β
. (25)
If φ < φ∗ then the elite rationally choose to manipulate factor prices. We suppose that if
the elite perceive there to be no risk of informational shocks sufficient to provoke revolution
(φ = 0), they always choose the inefficient method of predation.
Assumption 4. V e(E|b = 1, φ = 0) − V e(E|b = 0, φ = 0) > 0, which requires that (Ae −
αAm) > τ ∗(1− α)Amθm.
The assumption ensures that φ∗ > 0. If φ = 1, choosing the inefficient institution will
provoke revolution with certainty. The elite would have earned higher first period income
by maximizing output and setting τ = 1. Due to assumption 3, the elite prefer to prevent
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revolution and put in place the conciliatory tax rate. Thus, we can be sure that φ∗ < 1. The
next proposition summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 3. Under the threat of revolution, the Markov Perfect Equilibrium can feature
the elite choosing to use factor price manipulation (b = 1) depending on the possibility of
shocks severe enough to violate the revolution constraint, summarized by the distribution
parameter φ. If assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied, then there exists a φ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that
1. If φ > φ∗, then the elite rationally choose the efficient method of predation.
2. If φ < φ∗, then the elite rationally choose the inefficient method of predation.
Moreover, the critical value φ∗ is (i) increasing in Ae and (ii) decreasing in τ ∗.
The comparative statics results follow from taking partial derivatives of equation (25).
The first indicates that when elite entrepreneurs are more productive, the inefficient method
of predation becomes more attractive due to higher profits of elite entrepreneurs and the
elite tolerate a higher probability that the workers will revolt. The second indicates that
when the elite can extract greater revenues efficiently by taxing labor income (under the
revolution constraint), the efficient method of predation becomes more attractive and the
probability of informational shocks must be lower for the elites to decide to engage in factor
price manipulation.
3.4 Information and contagious political transitions
Since there exists a conciliatory tax rate to satisfy the revolution constraint, there will never
be a transition to democracy if the elite choose the efficient economic institution. For the
elite, the expected stream of abnormal profits that follows from imposing barriers to entry
must be sufficiently high to cover the risk of revolution. Shocks to the level of confidence
in the middle class among the working class alter the workers’ expected value of revolting
within each period. If the expected value of revolt comes to exceed the value of the status
quo, democratic revolution is rational. Recall that the level of confidence in the middle class
in period t is given by ρt = ρ+t, where  follows some monotone cdf F . A positive  increases
the probability, in the workers’ perception, that growth potential exists in the economy, but
has been repressed by the autocrat’s economic policy. In other words, a positive shock to
ρt strengthens the perception that a transition to a laissez-faire economic institution will
have a payoff for the workers. We suppose that φρ is small and that t is independent across
countries so that the joint probability that ρt > ρ
∗ in two countries can be considered zero.
We suppose a small setN of identical countries, where φ < φ∗ in each country. Proposition
3 implies that factor price manipulation will be the method of predation chosen in each of
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the countries. We define µ∗ ≡ µ∗(ρ + ) as the lowest possible critical value for µ, given the
range of shocks possible on ρ. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4. If factor price manipulation was the chosen economic institution in the N
countries, then
1. a revolution is sparked in a country i ∈ N due to an informational shock with probability
φρ, and
2. if the revolution in country i ∈ N was low-cost, then it is a catalyst for revolution
in the other N−i identical countries if p and q are such that E(µt,N−i |µi = µ) < µ∗
[see equation (3)].
4 Extension: democratic consolidation
We now consider that following a revolution, democracy is not an absorbing state. That
is, we allow for the possibility that the elites can mount a coup following a transition to
democracy. We now suppose that contrary to our baseline model, neither the elite nor the
working class know ex ante the growth potential of the economy in the absence of barriers
to entry. Rather than a smooth transition to an absorbing democratic institution, we now
consider a new intermediate state, transitional democracy, S = TD (Acemoglu et al., 2010).
In any democratic state (transitional or consolidated), the elite can invest xe to mount a coup
and the workers can each invest xd to defend the democratic state. We suppose the simplest
possible contest for power; a successful coup requires that the total investment made by the
elite (xe) exceeds the total investment made by the working class for democratic consolidation
(xdL) each period.
21 In other words, if xe > xdL, then a coup would be successful (the state
reverts to S = E), and if xe ≤ xdL, then democracy is consolidated (the state becomes
S = D). Following a democratic revolution, the state is a transitory democracy and the
game in state TD is the following:
1. Median voter (a worker) chooses policy. Production takes place and the size of the
middle class is revealed if the elite had previously predated using barriers to entry.
2. Workers choose investments in democratic consolidation and the elite choose invest-
ments in mounting a coup.
3. Consumption takes place and outcome of the contest for power is revealed.
21See Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2007) for a review of the various contest functions used in the economics
of conflict literature. See also Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) for a related discussion of investments by elite
to maintain inefficient institutions.
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Clearly, the preferred policy of the median voter is laissez-faire, with no barriers to entry
(b = 0) and no predatory taxation (τ = 0). For simplicity, we now suppose that the size of
the middle class follows a two-point distribution, {θm, θm}. When production takes place,
the size of the middle class is revealed to be either θm = θm = 1, and the economy continues
to stagnate, or θm = θ
m
> L/λ > θm, and there is the potential for full employment.
We now discuss the willingness to invest in control over the economic institution for the
workers and the elite. For both players, investments must be individually rational. The elites
will never invest more than the value of retaking power; the maximum the elite are willing
to invest is given by:
xmaxe ≡ max {βV e(E|b = 1), βV e(E|τ = τ ∗)}
For the workers, the maximum individually rational investment depends on the revealed size
of the middle class and the chosen method of predation by the elite. If entry costs were
chosen by the elites, then the maximum that each worker is willing to invest is given by
xmaxd ≡
0 if θm = θ
m
Am(1− εα) if θm = θm
If there is no potential for economic growth in the transitory democracy, then unemployment
remains high, wages remain low, and the workers will not be willing to invest in defense of
democracy. If there is a potential for full employment in the economy, then each worker is
willing to invest up to the net increase in their expected wage [Am(1− εα)].
We suppose that there is a minimum level of investment that is required to mount a coup,
even if the workers do not invest, which we denote by xe. Furthermore, we suppose that the
elite may be constrained in their ability to make investments in a transitory democracy up
to some xe < x
max
e (due to freezing of access to financial assets, for example). Therefore, the
set of individually rational investments for the elite is xe ∈ [xe, xe]. If the equilibrium policy
was barriers to entry, we suppose that the elite perceive the probability that there will be no
growth in the transitory state by ξ, i.e., ξ = prob(θm = θm).
To begin, we consider the case where the elite choose entry costs in the Markov perfect
equilibrium (we show later that this is always the case if entry costs were chosen when
democracy is an absorbing state). We now characterize the optimal investment decisions of
the elite in the second stage. If the size of the middle class is revealed to be low, the value
function of the elites in the second stage of the game is
V e (TD|θm = θm) = −xe + βV e (E|b = 1) > V e(D) = 0.
22
As willingness to invest in democracy for the workers is zero in this case, the elite’s optimal
investment is the minimum that is required (xe). Since xe < xe < x
max
e = βV
e (E|b = 1),
the investment is individually rational. If, on the other hand, the size of the middle class is
revealed to be high so that there is the potential for full employment, the value function of
the elite in the second stage depends on the relative investments the classes are willing to
make.
V e
(
TD|θm = θm
)
=
0 = V e(D) if xe < xmaxd L−xmaxd L+ βV e (E|b = 1) > V e(D) if xe > xmaxd L
In the first case, the elite do not have the capacity to match the investment that workers are
willing to make, so the elite will not invest and democracy will be consolidated. In the second
case, the elite can match the maximum investment that workers are willing to make, so the
elite invest the minimum necessary to win the contest (xmaxd L). Since x
max
d L < xe < x
max
e =
βV e (E|b = 1), the investment is individually rational. For the remainder of the analysis in
this section, we consider the first case, since a transition to a consolidated democracy is not
possible in the second case.
Now that we have defined the optimal investments for the workers and the elites, we
analyze how introducing these investment decisions changes the value functions of the baseline
model when S = E. First, consider the decision of the elites. Equation (14), describing the
continuation value of the elite after choosing barriers to entry, becomes the following:
CV e(E|b = 1) = (1− φˆ)V e(E|b = 1) + φˆV e(TD), where
V e(TD) = ξV e (TD|θm = θm) > V e(D).
When the Markov perfect equilibrium policy choice is to impose barriers to entry, the proba-
bility of a revolt and a change of state to transitional democracy is given by φˆ. Note that the
critical value of ρ sufficient to trigger a revolt is different when democracy is not an absorbing
state. As a result, we have that φˆ 6= φ.
Similarly, the continuation value after a revolution for the working class [from the value
function in equation (15)] becomes the following:
CV l (E|r = 1, b = 1) = ρtV l
(
TD|θm = θm
)
+ (1− ρt)V l (TD|θm = θm) , (26)
where
V l
(
TD|θm = θm
)
=
1
1− β (A
m − xe/L) , and
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V l (TD|θm = θm) = 1
1− β εαA
m.
If growth potential is revealed (with probability ρt), the workers earn their marginal produc-
tivity, less the necessary expenditure for defending democracy, into perpetuity as democracy
will be consolidated. If, on the other hand, it is revealed that there is a tragedy of develop-
ment (with probability 1− ρt), then the workers have no incentive to invest in democracy’s
defense, power is conceded back to the elite, and the workers earn their expected wage under
dictatorial economic policy into perpetuity.
Proposition 5. For φ < φ∗, the elites continue to rationally choose factor price manipula-
tion. Moreover, with the possibility of a coup following a revolution, there is a larger range
of parameter values for which the elite rationally choose factor price manipulation.
Proof. The current income of the elite from choosing FPM when S = E remains the same
as before. The continuation values from choosing factor price manipulation vary only in the
sense that φV e(TD) > φV e(D) = 0. Consequently, the value of manipulating factor prices is
higher when there is the possibility of a coup. For workers, the continuation value from choos-
ing to revolt decreases with the possibility of a coup: 1
1−β [ρ (A
m − xe/L) + (1− ρ)εαAm] <
1
1−β [ρA
m + (1− ρ)εαAm]. As a result, the critical value ρ∗′ that solves the revolution
constraint for workers is higher than the previous critical value ρ∗. This implies that
the possibility of a shock sufficient to induce revolt is less likely, i.e., φˆ < φ. As a re-
sult, V e(E|b = 1) is higher with the possibility of a coup. When the elite do not know
the size of the middle class, their current income from choosing taxation is lower, i.e.,
(1−ξ)τ ∗(1−α)LAm < τ ∗(1−α)LAm. If the elite choose taxation, there is now the possibility
that there will be no taxable labor income (with probability ξ). As the institution (b) must
be chosen before the size of the middle class is revealed, the elite cannot revert to entry costs
if there is no taxable labor income. If the size of the middle class is revealed to be high, the
conciliatory tax rate will be the same τ ∗ as in the previous section. As a result, the φˆ∗ that
solves V e(E|b = 1) = V e(E|τ > 0) is lower than in the previous section, i.e., φˆ∗ < φ∗, so the
elite are more likely to choose factor price manipulation.
The next proposition summarizes this section’s discussion.
Proposition 6. If there is the possibility of a coup following a democratic revolution, then
1. When the level of development is sufficiently high (λθm > L), democracy is always
consolidated following a revolution if xdL ≥ xe
(
i.e., if Am − xe
L
≥ εαAm).
2. When there is a tragedy of development (λθm = λ < L), revolutions are followed by
coup d’etats and democracy is not consolidated.
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The result can explain why political institutions are more volatile in under-developed
countries, whereas democracy has been consolidated following revolutions in countries with
relatively well-developed economies.22 After a revolution, some growth towards full employ-
ment is a necessary condition for democracy to be successfully consolidated.
5 Discussion: The Arab Spring of 2011
At the beginning of 2011, revolutions swept across North Africa and the Middle East. The
initial mass protests in Tunisia and Egypt seemed to be particularly motivated by dis-
satisfaction with economic institutions. Over generations the region’s authoritarian regimes
shaped economic institutions to generate rent for themselves and their elite patrons. The
regimes had implemented stochastic barriers to entry, in the form of kickbacks, bureau-
cratic entry costs, and malevolent regulations, which shrank expected profit margins on
economic investments for entrepreneurs. As a result, the entrepreneurial class was deterred
from achieving operational scales to get the economy to full employment, and the labor force
was dramatically under-employed and under-paid. Overall, it appears that the revolts in
Tunisia and Egypt were sparked by desire for democratic control over economic institutions,
symbolized by Bouazizi’s protest suicide.
Rational revolutions can occur when the expected value of revolting shifts to exceed the
expected value of the status quo. We argued that such shifts can be the result of information
shocks. Informational shocks can be interpreted in two different ways in our model, depend-
ing on how one understands the length of the game’s periods. If a period’s length is very
short, one could think of instantaneous informational shocks, such as the Wikileaks release
on the Tunisian regime, which revealed that 50 per cent of large firms in Tunisia’s official
economy were controlled by Ben Ali’s vast extended family.23 If a period’s length is longer (a
presidential “term”, for example), one could think of informational shocks as more broad evo-
lutions in social communication. The diffusion of information technology in Northern Africa
has been explosive over the last decade, with cellular and wireless networks becoming com-
22In a similar vein, Besley and Persson (2010), find that political institutions are likely to be more volatile in
countries where resource rents are high relative to economic output. Our extension suggests that successful
consolidation of democracy requires a middle class of entrepreneurs of a sufficient measure to employ the
working class, a condition which seems independent of a country’s resource endowment, a priori.
23See cable 08TUNIS679, “Corruption in Tunisia: What’s Yours is Mine.” Released in November 2010, the
Wikileaks shock has been noted by many political commentators as a catalyst of the democratic revolution in
Tunisia at the beginning January 2011. Also note that the Wikileaks shock contained information to suggest
that the United States would not continue to support the Ben Ali regime indefinitely, since the interest of the
United States in the region did not depend on its survival. Such an information shock would affect the cost
parameter µ rather than the informational parameter we have stressed above. The result, of course, would
be identical.
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mon place. Such diffusion of informational technology made it far more difficult for the Ben
Ali regime to continue hiding its inefficient method of predation from the increasingly wired
Tunisian population. The emergence of Al Jazeera as an independent cable news network
dedicated to political events in the Arab world is an additional example of an information
shock within a period of long length. Whichever interpretation of time-period length, the
Tunisian democratic revolution in January 2011 can be rationalized within the context of
our model as an equilibrium outcome following a sufficiently strong shock to the information
parameter, ρ.
The Tunisian experience, while hardly without casualties, was a relatively low-cost polit-
ical transition: the army refused to repress the movement and the international community
put pressure on the regime to relinquish power. Over four weeks of revolt in Tunisia, 238
protestors were killed. It was not evident, a priori, that rebels in Tunisia would face so little
resistance. Within the context of our model, the Tunisian experience led to belief updating in
other countries, which drove the expected destructive cost of revolution low enough to make
the expected net benefit of revolting positive in other similar countries in the region. The
speed with which information about the Tunisian revolution, once revealed, was transmitted
worldwide, contributed to a revolution in Egypt within a month’s time.
Similarly, the Egyptian experience was relatively low cost, prompting further peaceful
demonstrations calling for political transitions throughout the region (Libya, Syria, Yemen,
Bahrain, Algeria). Whether the outcome will be a transition of power in these countries is
uncertain at the time of this writing. Staying within the context of our model, the use of
repressive force in Libya, Syria, and Algeria in response to the revolutionary demonstrations
provides adverse information about the cost of revolting. Thus, in the same way that the
revolutions became contagious, our model suggests they may come to an abrupt end as the
cost expectations for revolt are once again updated.
At the time of this writing, one year after the Egyptian revolution, there has been no eco-
nomic growth to speak of, and the political institution seems to be in the transitory democracy
stage. Our model suggests that, if the economic institution is liberalized, economic growth
must be sufficient to allow for individually rational investments in consolidating democratic
control.24 The contrast between the prospects for consolidation in Egypt and Libya are
particularly relevant to our final proposition. In Libya, where financial institutions and ed-
ucational systems are less developed, the likelihood of democratic consolidation seems much
smaller. If the (newly unregulated) entrepreneurial middle class is too slight, or lacks suf-
ficient access to credit, economic liberalization will not lead to the job-generating economic
24Joseph Stiglitz wrote about Tunisia in a Financial Times editorial on 25 May, 2011 “In six months time,
if the economy sinks further, forces arguing against liberal democracy will gain strength. The youth who led
the revolutions may become angry again, and give up hope.”
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growth required to rationalize investments in democratic consolidation.
6 Conclusion
This paper has considered the role of information asymmetries in explaining why authoritar-
ian rulers impose inefficient predatory institutions, such as barriers to entry for entrepreneurs
that are not among the ruler’s elite clientele. We have demonstrated that such institutional
choices carry the risk of provoking revolution, but can be rational choices for the elite if infor-
mational asymmetries are sufficiently strong. In the digital age, when informational diffusion
is less costly, releases of information that reduce the asymmetry may trigger revolutions
against autocratic regimes that have been predating the economy inefficiently. Moreover,
we have demonstrated the conditions under which revolutions can be contagious and when
revolutions can lead to consolidated laissez-faire economic institutions.
There appear to be many interesting avenues for future research in this area. For example,
we have not considered the role of ideology in the decision of the working class to revolt.
Future research could add a normative element to the utility functions of the agents. In
our model, the value of holding power is control over economic institutions. It will be
interesting to consider natural resource wealth as additional motivation for holding power.
Additionally, the analysis would be enriched by allowing for the possibility for the elite
to make investments in revolution prevention, through information control technology to
censor potential informational shocks (affecting φ), or in revolution repression technology
(affecting µ). Finally, the model has assumed that once a revolt gets under way, it is always
successful if a critical mass of the population participates. Future work should consider
strategic interaction between the elite and the workers which makes the probability of success
uncertain.
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